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“People know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do;  
but what they don't know is what what they do does.” 
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 2006. 
 
 
Abstract: 
Drug control policies and interventions, like any other policies and interventions, generate many unintended 
consequences. Most often, such consequences are mentioned without being defined or presented in a typology 
and they are rarely explained in terms of causality. This paper will stress how the existing work on the 
unintended consequences of drug control policies and interventions suffers from little or no definition and will 
then provide such a definition and a typology applied to three major interventions meant to achieve drug crop 
reduction: forced eradication, alternative development, and opium bans. In the end it will explain how a typology 
of unintended consequences can help to better understand the failure and even the counterproductivity of some 
interventions. Differentiating between direct and collateral unintended consequences allows us to better attribute 
the occurring of unintended consequences to a specific intervention and, or, to the intended consequence of the 
interventions.  
 
 
The steady increase in global illegal opium production observed since the early 1970s (3) occurred 
in spite of the many efforts deployed by the international community to suppress or reduce illegal 
opium poppy cultivation worldwide. Illegal opium production has increased despite countless forced 
eradication campaigns and in spite of many crop substitution and alternative development programs. 
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It can even be argued that the increase of illegal opium production is partly due, among other 
obvious push and pull actors, to the counterproductivity of forced eradication campaigns and to the 
inadequacy of alternative development projects. In fact it is now widely agreed that the global 
prohibition of certain drugs and the war on drugs have largely failed to reach their stated goals, that is, 
a drug-free world (Chouvy, 2009) (4).  
Drug control policies and interventions, like other policies and interventions, generate many 
unintended consequences, most of which can be held responsible for the overall failure of prohibition 
(which can also be blamed for generating seriously disruptive unintended consequences) but also for 
countless collateral damages in the social, economic, political, environmental, and human rights areas. 
Alleged unintended consequences of drug control policies and interventions include crop 
displacement (one aspect of the so-called balloon effect), increased prices and production, worsened 
corruption, heightened armed violence (especially in the context of armed conflicts), weakened 
counterinsurgency, but also social unrest, ethnic insurgency, environmental degradation, increased 
deforestation, destruction of legal crops, increased poverty and debt, school dropouts, prostitution, 
human smuggling and trafficking, needle sharing and spread of blood-borne diseases, health issues 
from poor quality of drugs, substance switch, increased street crime and violence, deteriorated human 
rights, etc. (Bertram et al., 1996; Chouvy, 2009; Costa, 2008; Friesendorf, 2007; Heilmann, 2010 ; 
Nadelmann, 2010; Reuter, 2009; Tullis, 1995; World Bank, 2004; etc.). 
Most often, such unintended consequences are mentioned without being defined or presented in a 
typology. They are also rarely explained in terms of causality, which is highly problematic considering 
how often drug control policies and interventions focus on consequences rather than on causes (for 
example targeting opium production instead of poverty and food insecurity) and how easily 
consequences can turn into causes of further consequences. It is also a problem because most such 
unintended consequences are the subject of highly controversial and passionate debates, for example, 
between advocates and opponents of forced eradication. A typology of unintended consequences of 
drug control policies and interventions is therefore needed not only to better understand the chains of 
causality that may hinder these policies and interventions, but also to help foresee and prevent the 
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unintended consequences they might generate, especially the most perverse and harmful ones. This is 
basically what Ethan Nadelmann called for in a 2010 testimony to the U.S. congress on the war on 
drugs when he asked that “federal agencies involved in the drug war devote a portion of their budgets 
to evaluating the efficacy and unintended consequences of their policies and programs” (Nadelmann, 
2010). A better understanding of unintended consequences is obviously a prerequisite to a better 
policy evaluation and, eventually, to better drug control policies: determining if a policy's 
consequences are intended or not, beneficial or harmful, or even perverse, is crucial. 
This article will first stress how the existing work on the unintended consequences of drug control 
policies and interventions suffers from little or no definition. It will then provide such a definition. A 
typology of the unintended consequences of drug control policies and interventions will follow and 
will be applied to three major interventions meant to achieve drug crop reduction: forced eradication, 
alternative development, and opium bans (coercion not to plant). In the end it will explain how a 
typology of unintended consequences can help better understand the failure and even the 
counterproductivity of some interventions. 
Undefined unintended consequences 
In order to assess what the unintended consequences of drug control policies and interventions 
are, one first needs to define what unintended consequences are and, before that, assess what the 
stated goals of drug control policies are. According the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
the stated goal of the international drug control regime is to regulate the legal production, trade and 
consumption of drugs on the one hand and, on the other hand, to achieve the suppression of illegal 
drug production, trafficking and possession mainly through criminal law, that is, through prohibition 
measures. Yet, as many have observed, “the system, being a prohibition regime focusing on control of 
the production of psychoactive substances that are deemed to be harmful, has over time developed 
side-effects that were not foreseen (at least in their magnitude) when it was established” (Heilmann, 
2010: 32). These side-effects, or unintended consequences, have been denounced at length for 
decades. 
Yet, among the vast literature on drug issues very little material explains clearly what unintended 
consequences are and how they occur. LaMond Tullis’ 1995 book on “Unintended Consequences. 
 4 
 
Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in Nine Countries”, for example, provides no definition or typology 
of unintended consequences. Other texts, such as a 1988 article by Ethan Nadelmann, describe 
unintended consequences in more details and even give a sense of the complexity of the issue but fall 
short of defining them (Nadelmann, 1988). Among the few authors that have attempted to define what 
unintended consequences are and how the concept applies to the field of illegal drug studies is Peter 
Reuter. In a 2009 exploratory report titled “The unintended consequences of drug policies”, Reuter 
does not define what unintended consequences are but he raises a fundamental point when he explains 
that “an important distinction is between consequences that arise from prohibition itself, as opposed to 
those resulting from specific implementing programmes” (Reuters, 2009: 4). He then offers a valuable 
typology - which he terms taxonomy (5) - of unintended consequences, in which he details the 
mechanisms at work, the bearers of consequences, and the nature of harms (Reuter, 2009: 10). In the 
end, Reuter stresses a point of great importance when he writes that “almost all of the unintended 
consequences share one important characteristic; they are unmeasured” (Reuter, 2009: 10). 
Indeed, most of the so-called unintended consequences of the illegal drug industry or of drug 
control policies and interventions are unmeasured and unproven, something that is explained in part 
because “measuring the illegal drug industry raises innumerable conceptual, technical, and political 
issues” (Thoumi, 2005: 186; see also Reuter & Greenfield, 2001). In a text on unintended 
consequences, Antonio Maria Costa, a former Executive Director of the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, raises the case of such a consequence that is very often mentioned but never 
measured, the so-called balloon effect, or geographical displacement of a crop (Costa, 2008: 10). 
Costa rightly explains that large such balloon effects can be inferred from various repeated 
correlations but that the causality between a squeeze in one place and a swell in another place can 
hardly be measured or proven. Correlation obviously does not necessarily imply causation, something 
that the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference – according to which it is impossible to observe the 
effect that would have happened if the determinant were exposed to another condition at the same 
time – only makes more complicated (Holland, 1986; Heckman, 2005). This is actually what 
Cornelius Friesendorf, the author of the most detailed and serious study of the balloon effect (a term 
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he rightly rejects), stresses when he writes that “a heuristic, interpretative approach” is needed in 
order to grasp “the presence of various empirical black boxes, the presence of complex, dynamic 
interaction effects, the fuzzy nature of corruption and other phenomena contributing to displacement, 
and the difficulty of assigning causal weight to explanatory factors and processes” (Friesendorf, 2005: 
67). 
In his paper Costa lists five unintended consequences of what he terms “the control system and its 
application”, that is, the prohibition regime on one hand, and drug control policies and interventions 
on the other hand, two very different things that he groups indiscriminately. The first unintended 
consequence he mentions, a “huge criminal black market”, is clearly a consequence of the prohibition 
regime. The second unintended consequence is actually a consequence of the black market itself: what 
he calls the “policy displacement”, that is, the focus on coercion and the allocation of public funds to 
law enforcement and public security rather than to public health. Geographical displacement, the third 
unintended consequence, is not a direct consequence of the prohibition regime but rather of drug 
production reduction interventions, especially bans and eradication. A fourth unintended consequence 
is “substance displacement”, for example from opium to heroin: again, a consequence of repression, 
both at the production reduction and demand reduction levels. The fifth unintended consequence, 
according to Costa, is the exclusion and stigmatization of drug users, the causes of which are more 
difficult to ascertain. These unintended consequences, far from being exhaustive, differ at least 
according to their direct causes and, for the sake of clarity, should not be combined in a unique 
category. Where Costa is right, though, is when he writes that “unless we face these unintended 
consequences head-on, we will continue to be mesmerized by the many paradoxes of the drug 
problem” (Costa, 2008: 10-11). But before being faced head-on, unintended consequences first need 
to be defined and categorized according to their occurrence mechanisms and their causes. This is 
obviously no small task as Francisco Linares explains that, despite unintended consequences being 
“undoubtedly one of the key concepts in sociology” and despite the efforts of many scholars who have 
attempted its analysis (including Baert, Boudon, Elster, Merton, and Portes), “there is not a general 
explanatory model of the emergence of unintended consequences of social action” (Linares, 2009: 1). 
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This essay obviously does not intend to offer such a general explanation. It is an initial attempt at 
better understanding the unintended consequences of drug control policies and interventions. 
Toward a definition and a typology of unintended consequences 
Strictly speaking, unintended consequences are consequences that were not planned for in a plan 
of action, whether the consequences are contrary or not to the actor’s initial objectives. Of course, and 
as stressed by Daniel Little, an unintended consequence differs from an “unfortunate event” (6). In 
what is widely considered to be the seminal paper on unintended consequences, “The Unanticipated 
Consequences of Purposive Social Action” (1936), Robert Merton explained that, “rigorously 
speaking, the consequences of purposive action are limited to those elements in the resulting situation 
which are exclusively the outcome of the action, i.e., those elements which would not have occurred 
had the action not taken place” (Merton, 1936: 895). The unintended consequences of drug control 
policies should therefore be considered to be the direct and strict outcomes of drug control policies 
and interventions, that is, of the efforts produced to achieve the reduction or suppression of drug 
production, trafficking, and consumption.  
Yet, Merton actually refers to unforeseen or unanticipated consequences in his paper, not to 
unintended consequences. He explains that “unforeseen consequences should not be identified with 
consequences which are necessarily undesirable (from the point of view of the actor)” and that the 
“intended and anticipated outcomes of purposive action, however, are always, in the nature of the 
case, relatively desirable to the actor, though they may seem axiologically negative to an outside 
observer” (Merton, 1936: 895). In fact, unintended consequences differ from unanticipated 
consequences (7) since outcomes that were not intended by purposive action can be foreseen or not: 
unintended consequences can be anticipated or not. Indeed, as Paul Helm explains, “a person might 
therefore not intend a particular consequence of his action but still foresee it. In saying that he might 
not intend a particular consequence it is implied not that the consequence is necessarily not intended 
but that it is neither intended nor unintended” (Helm, 1971: 51-52). 
Moreover, an unintended consequence, whether foreseen or not, can also be harmful or beneficial, 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” being a famous example of the latter. It can also be neutral but we will 
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not concern ourselves with this specific case here. Daniel Little stresses that “we can't know all the 
possible results of an action undertaken”. He then explains that the so-called law of unintended 
consequences implies that, “no matter how careful one is in estimating the probable consequences of a 
line of action, there is the residual possibility that the action will produce harmful unanticipated 
consequences that negate the purpose of the action” (what we will later call perverse unintended 
consequences). According to Little, the planner of an action “should design the plan so as to minimize 
avoidable bad consequences; then do a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether the value of the 
intended consequences outweighs the harms associated with the unintended consequences.” Indeed, it 
is possible that “an undesired outcome is both unintended but also fully foreseen.” In fact, some will 
argue that most of the unintended consequences of drug control policies seem to fall into that 
category. Most of them have been suspected for decades but keep occurring mostly as the result of the 
perpetuating, and often of the increase, of inadequate or failed policies and interventions. Such 
consequences also keep occurring partly because they are often ignored or, to use Merton’s 
terminology, not recognized. Again, most unintended consequences can only be alleged because they 
are unmeasured and unproven. 
But to make things a bit more complex, Helm writes: “An action can perfectly well have 
unintended consequences which are the effect not of any intended consequences of it but simply of the 
action itself. So an action may have one or a set of unintended consequences (set I) that is collateral to 
another consequence or set of consequences (set II), in the sense that set I may have an intended 
consequence as one of its necessary conditions, set II may not” (Helm, 1971: 52). It is important 
indeed to acknowledge that the “unintended consequences of intended actions” clearly differ from 
“the collateral consequences of intended actions” (Helm, 1971: 52). 
At this point the understanding of causal mechanisms is essential. Considering how complex 
interaction effects and contingent conditions can prove and how they can change outcomes in 
unforeseeable ways, the choice of probabilistic causality over deterministic causality seems logical: 
one can only assume the likely, not the systematic, effect of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable. As Friesendorf rightly explains about crop displacement – what he calls a side effect rather 
than an unintended consequence (8) – the fact that “numerous background conditions, idiosyncrasies, 
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and explanatory factors may operate simultaneously or in a random order […] means that although 
displacement can be studied as a chronological sequence of events, the underlying causality of 
displacement cannot be studied in this manner” (Friesendorf, 2005: 44-45). Indeed, illegal drug 
production and drug control policies and intervention take place in a system of complex interactions 
that has the potential of generating many unintended and unforeseen consequences. As stressed by 
Robert Jervis and others, such complex systems are non-linear and cannot be “understood by adding 
together the units or their relations” (Jervis, 1997; Aoi et al., 2007: 11). Alejandro Portes also 
expresses skepticism about the routine implementation of a linear relationship, that is, the “straight 
arrow between the avowed goal of actors-individual or collective-and the achieved end-state” (Portes; 
2000: 8) (9). 
Direct and collateral unintended consequences (harmful, beneficial, and perverse) 
A typology of unintended consequences is a prerequisite to their study and analysis, if only to 
avoid a few common mistakes, including an obvious yet not uncommon such mistake mentioned by 
Chiyuki Aoi et al.: “Unintended consequences need to be distinguished from a failure to achieve the 
intended consequences” (Aoi et al., 2007: 6). Indeed, an increase in opium poppy cultivation caused 
by forced eradication clearly differs from a cultivation increase being unhindered by failed forced 
eradication, or even from a renewed cultivation the year after a successful yet unrepeated forced 
eradication.  
To begin with, one needs to distinguish between two main types of unintended consequences: the 
unintended consequences of an action (set II of Helm or direct consequences) and the unintended 
consequences of the intended consequence of the action (set I of Helm or collateral consequences). 
Direct and collateral unintended consequences can of course be harmful, beneficial, or even neutral 
(for actors, institutions, and even the environment), but also foreseen or unforeseen. But they can also 
be perverse. 
Perverse unintended consequences are consequences of an action (direct consequence) or of the 
intended consequence of an action (collateral consequence) that contradict the initial goal of a given 
purposive action: an increase in cultivation caused by forced eradication or some of its consequences 
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(poverty and debt increase) for example. Here the temporal order and the bearers of the action 
obviously matter: since one consequence may easily become a cause, there are also proximate and 
ultimate, or rather distal (for causality chains may be endless), unintended consequences that occur 
very far down and, or, very late, in the causality chain. Indeed, forced eradication can be said to be 
successful in year 1 but counterproductive in year 2. Perverse unintended consequences obviously 
should matter the most to policy makers because they reveal the inefficiency or even the 
counterproductivity of a given policy and, or, intervention.  
Yet, as Daase and Friesendorf write, “many unintended consequences do not fall into neat 
categories”: “it is not always clear whether and when unintended consequences impact on policy 
initiators or others, and whether such consequences are positive or negative” (Daase, Friesendorf, 
2010: 10). Still, unintended consequences being consequences that were not planned for in a plan of 
action, one should distinguish between two main types of unintended consequences: direct and 
collateral. Such a distinction basically allows us to differentiate the consequences of an action from 
the consequences of the intended consequence of an action: it can prove useful in assessing the 
efficiency or the inefficiency of a given policy and of its various interventions.  
All public policies create unintended consequences of the direct and collateral types, whether they 
are beneficial, harmful, neutral, or perverse. Some of them can be foreseen, others cannot. Harms and 
benefits can be felt at various levels, in the short term or in the long term, and by various bearers: 
from individuals to various groups and subgroups, governments, nations, to national and international 
organizations. In the end, drug control policies can only be successful, that is, to achieve their 
intended consequences, if no perverse unintended consequence is generated or, in other words, if they 
do not end up being counterproductive. That is, also, when harmful unintended consequences are kept 
to a minimum so that further consequences, including perverse ones, are less likely (10).  
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Table 1. Example of various unintended consequences of forced eradication 
 
 
 Direct unintended consequences  Collateral unintended consequences 
Action Beneficial Harmful Perverse Intended 
consequence 
Beneficial Harmful Perverse 
Eradication Restored 
law 
Violence 
increase 
“Balloon 
effect” 
Suppressed 
cultivation 
Price hike Poverty 
increase 
Cultivation 
increase 
 
Unintended consequences of forced eradication 
Drug production reduction can be attempted in three different ways, independently or 
concurrently: coercion not to plant (when local or national authorities issue and implement a crop ban, 
out of authority), eradication (when standing crops are destroyed, forcefully or not), and economic 
development usually referred to as alternative development (when economic alternatives are provided 
to farmers involved in illegal agricultural production). Forced eradication of drug crops is the most 
coercive intervention aimed at achieving drug production reduction and provides a good example of 
the various unintended consequences that drug control policies and their interventions can generate.  
The intended consequence of forced eradication (the action) of opium poppies is the suppression 
of the crop. The most obvious unintended consequences of successful forced eradication are crop 
displacement and, or, increased cultivation, as mentioned, for example, in a World Bank report on 
Afghanistan: “A key lesson is that eradication alone will not work and is likely to be 
counterproductive, resulting in perverse incentives for farmers to grow more drugs (e.g. in Colombia), 
displacement of production to more remote areas, and fuelling of violence and insecurity (Peru, 
Bolivia, Colombia), which in several cases forced the eradication policy to be reversed and led to 
adverse political outcomes” (World Bank, 2004: 87). Here, of course, causality can only be assumed – 
since it can hardly be scientifically proven – on the basis of previous observations (correlations), and 
also of induction (11). To be more specific, crop displacement and increased cultivation can be said to 
From action to direct UCs, to intended consequence, and to collateral UCs 
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be collateral perverse unintended consequences: the outcome is clearly contrary to the intended 
consequence of the initial action and is clearly an effect of that intended consequence (set I of Helm). 
In this case it could be argued that we are also confronted with a foreseen or at least a foreseeable 
unintended consequence for such consequences have allegedly occurred so often and in so many 
countries that they could be said to be predictable (12). 
Now, the action of forcefully eradicating a crop might also stir armed violence as insurgents (in 
Afghanistan especially) often oppose the eradication teams (themselves often if not always protected 
by armed forces). Armed violence can be said to be an unintended consequence of the action itself but 
not of the crop having being eradicated (that is, the action’s intended consequence) per se: it is a direct 
harmful unintended consequence (set II of Helm) that could easily be foreseen since armed violence 
often occurs to prevent the action from being carried out and can take place without any eradication 
being conducted (when violence achieves its goal of preventing eradication).  
Environmental pollution and the destruction of food crops or other cash crops can be said to be 
other direct harmful unintended consequences when eradication is conducted through aerial spraying 
of chemicals: they can occur outside of the actual destruction of the drug crops and are then 
consequences not of the drug crop having been destroyed but of the action itself. Here, again, these 
consequences can easily be foreseen as such collateral damages have often been documented, 
especially in South America (Messina, Delamater, 2002; Vargas, 2002). 
Harmful unintended consequences, whether direct or collateral, are legion and many of them 
could again easily be foreseen since they have been documented – yet rarely measured or proven – on 
numerous occasions and in various countries. To name but a few: poverty increase (the main driver of 
illegal opium production being poverty, eradicating poppy fields most often increases poverty); debt 
increase (when opium is sold ahead of the harvest and when eradication prevents the repayment of 
debts); food shortages (when opium is meant to be sold to buy food), school drop-outs (when opium 
sales allow families to send their children to school), etc. The eradication of an opium poppy crop will 
often deprive targeted farmers and seasonal workers from most of their income (and, or, ability to 
repay debts) and resources (access to land, work, credit) and can be said to be responsible of various 
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coping strategies (unintended consequences) that include rural exodus, prostitution (especially in 
Burma), deforestation (as in Burma but also in Afghanistan), poaching (again, in Burma or in Laos), 
etc. (Chouvy, 2009; Jelsma, Kramer, 2005). 
It is important to note that if harmful unintended consequences of forced eradication do not 
always cause the occurring of perverse unintended consequences, the latter rarely occur outside of 
preceding harmful unintended consequences: depending on the context and on other factors, poverty 
and debt increase may or may not lead to crop displacement or increased cultivation. Causality is of 
course not systematic and some opium farmers may have other options than renew and increase 
cultivation. Crop displacement is also not systematic and is highly context-dependent and subject to 
many explanatory factors. What is more, harmful unintended consequences can take place ahead of, 
or after, perverse unintended consequences: some such consequences (poverty and debt increase for 
example, but also price hikes) can be caused by the intended consequence (eradicated crops) and be 
the immediate cause of crop displacement or cultivation increase (to cope with income loss), but other 
harmful unintended consequences can also be caused by the perverse unintended consequence 
(deforestation caused by crop displacement, decrease of food crop production caused by increased 
drug crops) at a later stage. Unfortunately, there are far less beneficial unintended consequences, 
beyond the price hikes benefiting some farmers, the unlikely development of alternative crops, the 
even more unlikely lowering of corruption, and targeted poppy cultivators and seasonal workers 
joining the military (as in Afghanistan). 
In the end, forced eradication most often increases poverty and therefore reinforces the main 
driver of opium production without addressing its causes, including land scarcity, unequal land tenure 
arrangements, oversized households (Afghanistan) or lack of workforce (Burma, Laos), food 
insecurity, climatic vagaries, political upheavals, armed conflicts, etc. (Chouvy, 2009; Ducourtieux, 
2004; Mansfield, 2004). Forced eradication is highly likely to be counterproductive, that is, to have 
perverse unintended consequences. Worse, forced eradication also generates many harmful 
unintended consequences, most of them collateral. We will see that while alternative development 
also generates harmful unintended consequences, most of them are direct unintended consequences. 
Also, alternative development is much less likely to provoke perverse unintended consequences. 
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Unintended consequences of alternative development 
Rural development, a constructive intervention often labeled as alternative development when 
implemented in regions of illegal agricultural drug production, sets goals that take much longer to be 
met and whose success is much more complicated to demonstrate than forced eradication. Causality 
chains and unintended consequences are far more complex to infer than with forced eradication, not 
only because development-related interventions have considerably evolved and diversified during the 
past four decades (unlike forced eradication) but also because rural development being a constructive 
intervention, it relies on a wide and complex range of actions rather than on single measures. Such 
actions range from introducing new seeds or new crops, along with improving agricultural techniques 
and tools, to providing or upgrading health and social equipments and varied infrastructure work. 
Also, national strategies can be organized around various priority areas and pillars of action. They 
often involve a large number of actors, from national agencies to international bodies and local and 
foreign NGOs. Assessing the efficiency of rural development in suppressing or even reducing illegal 
agricultural drug crops in such complex contexts can obviously prove very difficult.  
In fact, many observers agree that “in those places where lasting reductions in production have 
been seen, other possible influences on farmer decisions not to cultivate drug crops can be put forward 
as being equally likely causes for change. These include: overall economic growth (Thailand and Viet 
Nam), political change (Myanmar), increasing government access to formerly remote areas 
(Pakistan), social pressure (Lao PDR, Bolivia), subsidies (Thailand), and booming prices for 
alternative crops (coffee and cacao growing areas)” (UNODC, 2005: 9-10; see also Jelsma, 2002).  
Unintended consequences of alternative development have also proven very diverse depending on 
the type of rural development undertaken but also on the extremely varied local settings: the crop 
substitution programs implemented in Turkey and Thailand in the early 1970s differed from the 
integrated rural development first experimented with in Peru in the early 1980s, and from the 
alternative development approach devised in the 1990s and tested for example in Thailand and in 
Pakistan. Crop substitution programs have been widely documented both in Latin America and in 
Asia. In the highlands of Thailand such programs produced mixed results in the 1970s with harmful 
unintended consequences such as market gluts and decreasing prices, soil and stream pollution due to 
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excess of chemical pesticides and fertilizers, etc. (Renard, 2001: 57-68) Eventually, the 2000s, marked 
by the unprecedented increase of Afghanistan’s opium production, saw the emergence of the 
alternative livelihoods approach (13), the last step in a forty-year trend that saw development 
programs in drug production contexts become increasingly complex (Mansfield, Pain, 2005). 
Since the intended consequence of alternative development programs is the reduction or even the 
suppression of a drug crop, its perverse unintended consequences would presumably be the same 
compared with forced eradication, that is, crop displacement and, or, increased cultivation. Yet, 
provided that human security and state stability exist, successful alternative development projects are 
less likely to have such perverse unintended consequences: alternative development often fails for 
various reasons but rarely proves counterproductive, unlike forced eradication (Chouvy, 2009). This is 
actually an example of when “unintended consequences need to be distinguished from a failure to 
achieve the intended consequences” (Aoi et al., 2007: 6).  In the end, alternative development is more 
likely to provoke direct unintended consequences than collateral unintended consequences. This is 
because the intended consequence, the suppression of the illegal crop, is rarely obtained (for various 
reasons), but also because the suppression of an illegal crop is to be obtained by progressively 
substituting an economy to another one. There is obviously also much less risk of perverse unintended 
consequences occurring when crop suppression is obtained progressively through economic 
development than when it is achieved suddenly and without compensation through forced eradication 
(14). In fact, in the context of alternative development, crop displacement and cultivation increase 
phenomena are more likely to be the effect not of the intended consequence of the action (alternative 
development takes years if not decades to achieve drug production reduction) but of the effect of the 
action itself (the procurement of alternative livelihoods). 
Such unintended consequences were suspected in various countries, at various times, and for 
various reasons, almost always in the short term (Chouvy, 2009: 178-187). In Afghanistan, for 
example, some alternative development projects are likely to have played a positive role in reducing 
opium production in targeted areas and for short periods (in Helmand in the late 2000s for example) 
but are also believed of having quickly spurred production around the project areas. In fact, when 
rural development projects are scarce and, or, insufficiently funded, opium production can be 
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perceived as part of a means of attracting international aid. Alternative development being always 
carried out locally and often as pilot projects, it can act as an incentive for opium production in areas 
where no rural development, “alternative” or not, is implemented. Yet the failure of an alternative 
development project can also lead to the quick resurgence of a drug production, as has been the case 
in northern Laos in the late 2000s, when poppy cultivation largely resumed because, according to 
UNODC, of a lack of economic alternatives. The resurgence or even increase of cultivation can also 
happen despite, and not because of, the implementation of an alternative development project: most 
notably when alternative development takes place after forced eradication and not before. 
Unintended consequences of opium bans 
Opium bans (coercion not to plant) can also prove highly counterproductive, as the opium ban 
implemented by the Taliban in 2000 clearly showed (Chouvy, 2009: 150-152; Macdonald, 2007: 84). 
Opium bans differ from eradication for they amount to the interdiction of cultivation, not to the forced 
destruction of standing crops: local (the Wa in Burma for example) or national authorities (the 
Taliban, the Pakistani and the Lao governments for example) issue an opium ban and opium farmers 
comply. Successful interdiction results from the use of authority and power while forced eradication is 
obtained by force, although threat of force (including eradication) use obviously makes bans more 
easily and widely respected. A consequence of the Taliban ban was the steep rise of opium prices in 
the country, which translated into a collateral perverse unintended consequence (15) of the ban (it 
was a consequence of the intended consequence of the ban), which was that poppy cultivation 
resumed with renewed vigor as early as 2002 as many opium farmers had to quickly repay their debts 
(aggravated by the ban) and took advantage of inflated opium prices. These two consequences 
actually kept driving Afghan opium production up during the following years, in spite of the repeated 
opium bans pronounced by the Karzai administration. 
Such a cultivation and production increase had actually already occurred in Pakistan 
consecutively to the 1979 Prohibition Order: since the population had been warned in 1978 that opium 
poppy cultivation would be banned in 1980, the 1979 illegal crop became the largest in Pakistani 
history, something that was most likely expected and can only be said to have been a direct 
unintended consequence for it was not an effect of the intended consequence (rather an effect of the 
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anticipated intended consequence) but an effect of the action (a forthcoming ban). Here the effective 
ban was largely held responsible, rightly or not, for a hike of the Afghan production, in the same way 
that the 2003 surge in cultivation (collateral perverse unintended consequence) in the Wa area of 
Burma was said to be linked to the opium ban enforced the same year in the neighboring Kokang 
region. Both the Kokang (2003) and Wa (2005) opium bans also had collateral harmful unintended 
consequences: assistance was then (and still is) clearly “insufficient to offset the impact of the opium 
bans, and to cover basic needs of ex-opium farmers” (Transnational Institute, 2005: 16). In fact, 
according to UNODC, “in Special Region 2 (Wa) […] where local authorities enforced an opium ban 
in 2005, farmers have lost up to 70% of their cash income” (UNODC, 2006: 15). 
Of the importance of acknowledging and understanding unintended consequences 
Better assessments of drug control policies and interventions are clearly needed to design policies 
and interventions that are more efficient, less harmful and, of course, less counterproductive. But a 
better assessment of drug control policies and interventions requires more than simply enumerating 
unintended consequences: it actually takes the developing of systematic ways of studying them 
(Reuter, 2009). And a more thorough study of unintended consequences first requires not confusing 
them with a failure to achieve the intended consequences (Aoi et al., 2007). Then, as Peter Reuter 
makes clear, another “important distinction is between consequences that arise from prohibition itself, 
as opposed to those resulting from specific implementing programmes” (Reuter, 2009: 2010). 
What is also required is discerning between the two main types of unintended consequences: 
direct and collateral, that is, between, the unintended consequences of an action and the unintended 
consequences of the intended consequence of an action (Helm, 1971). Differentiating between direct 
and collateral unintended consequences makes a more precise assessment of actions and of their 
intended consequences possible. Since the reduction or suppression of illegal drug cultivation can be 
obtained through three different interventions, separately or concurrently, in various sequencing 
orders, and with different resources made available for each intervention, a better assessment of drug 
supply reduction at the production level implies analyzing complex interaction effects and contingent 
conditions that can change outcomes in unforeseeable ways. As stressed by Friesendorf, empirical 
black boxes, complex and dynamic interaction effects, corruption, and the “difficulty of assigning 
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causal weight to explanatory factors and processes” makes the study of unintended consequences a 
very difficult undertaking (Friesendorf, 2005: 67). Yet, differentiating between direct and collateral 
unintended consequences allows us to better attribute the occurring of unintended consequences to a 
specific intervention or to a specific set of interventions, on the one hand, and to the intended 
consequence of the interventions on the other hand.  
Harmful unintended consequences are of course to be avoided as much as possible, whether they 
occur before or after the suppression of illegal drug cultivation, in the short term or in the long term, 
and no matter who the bearers are. Cost-benefit analyses obviously matter to assess whether the value 
of the intended consequences outweighs the harms associated with the unintended consequences but 
drug control policies and interventions can still be successful despite causing serious harms to various 
bearers. Yet, harmful unintended consequences can foster perverse unintended consequence and 
compromise drug control policies altogether. Avoiding perverse unintended consequences, i.e. the 
counterproductivity of the actions undertaken or of their intended consequences, is of course a 
prerequisite to more efficient drug control policies. The fact that collateral perverse unintended 
consequences are much less likely to be generated by alternative development than by forced 
eradication shows that it is the interventions and not their basically identical intended consequences 
(the reduction and, or, suppression of illegal drug cultivation) that are to be better selected to achieve 
drug control policy goals.  
Specifying expected outcomes of drug control policies, on one hand, and, on the other hand, 
acknowledging errors from the past in order to avoid perverse but also harmful unintended 
consequences – and especially the foreseeable ones – is key to a more efficient and less detrimental 
international drug control regime. The variety and complexity of unintended consequences clearly 
needs to be integrated in the design process of drug control policies in order to avoid 
counterproductive drug control interventions. Yet, at this stage, further theoretical and empirical work 
is obviously needed to better understand how and why intended and unintended consequences of drug 
control policies and interventions are produced. What is needed is more complex and detailed 
typologies along with more accurate descriptions of the causality chains at work, something that 
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obviously requires specific empirical research, for example on where, when, how, and why cultivation 
increases and crop displacements occur, or not. 
 
Notes 
1) This article is part of the LINKSCH Research Project, funded by the European 
Commission. Thanks go to Laurent Laniel and David Mansfield for their comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. 
2) Geographer and research fellow at CNRS-Prodig, Paris, France. Author of Les 
territoires de l’opium (2002, Genève: Olizane), Yaa Baa (2004, Singapore: Singapore 
University Press), and Opium. Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy (2009 / 2010, London / 
Cambridge: I.B. Tauris / Harvard University Press). 
3) Allegedly 1,066 tons in 1970, one year before the launch of the war on drugs, and, 
according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, at least 10,649 tons in 2009, 
including 2,895 tons of non-processed opium (UNODC, 2010). In 2012, without explanation, 
UNODC did not mention (or did not include in its estimate?) any production of non-
processed opium, making its global estimate of 6,995 tons impossible to compare with the 
2009 output (UNODC, 2012). 
4) Despite the post-1971 surge in illegal production of opium, coca, and maybe 
cannabis, partisans of the containment theory suggest that an “increase in the size and scope 
of the illicit drug industry would have been far greater in the absence of law enforcement” 
(Windle and Farrel, 2012: 874). Others adopt a more balanced approach: “The consolidation 
and expansion of the control regime in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, to include prohibition 
against consumption, did not prevent renewed expansion of opiate consumption or the 
tendency toward mass markets and widespread distribution networks-nor does the adoption of 
the more stringent policies appear to have caused them” (Paoli, Greenfield, Reuter, 2012: 
932). 
5) On the difference between typology and taxonomy, see Smith, 2002. 
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6) Understanding Society, blog of Daniel Little: 
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.fr/search?q=unintended+consequences (retrieved on 14 May 
2012). 
7) Although Merton refers to unintended and unanticipated consequences of actions 
interchangeably in a footnote of his 1957 book Social Theory and Social Structure 
8) In another text, Friesendorf, along with Christopher Daase, explains that it is better to 
speak of unintended consequences rather than of side effects or paradoxical effects: referring 
to Jervis they ask how one can say which effect was a main effect and which one was a side 
effect. (Daase, Friesendorf, 2010: 9) 
9) Portes actually offers a valuable typology of five alternatives that represent different 
end-states from those assumed by a purposive logic: (1) the real goal is not the apparent one; 
(2) the real goal is not what the actors actually achieve; (3) the real goal emerges from the 
situation itself; (4) the original goal is real, but the end-state is contrary to its intent; (5) the 
original goal is real, but it is achieved by an unexpected combination of events (Portes, 2000: 
8). 
10) It was asked by two anonymous reviewers of this paper to refer to the literature on 
types of crime displacement (Repetto, 1976) and on the diffusion of benefits theory, according 
to which the geographical displacement of crime (crimes prevented in a given area are 
displaced into other areas), for example, happens along with the geographical diffusion of 
benefits (in addition to crime reduction or suppression in the target area there are further 
benefits in terms of reduced crime levels in other areas) (Barr and Pease, 1990 ; Clarke and 
Weisburd, 1994). Yet we doubt that an approach in terms of crime displacement and of 
diffusion is adapted to the subject under review, for various reasons: because opium farmers 
are not criminals (maybe offenders, but not by choice); because opium production is more an 
economic matter than a police or military matter; because crop displacement in rural areas of 
poor countries cannot decently be compared to crime displacement in cities of modern 
countries; and because the diffusion of benefits is very unlikely to take place in the case of 
forced eradication (low opportunity cost of planting opium poppy and having it eradicated, 
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which means that cultivating wheat instead of opium poppy is generally not an option as few 
farmers have sufficient land) or in the case of alternative development (the history of AD is 
mostly a history of failed small scale projects and no so-called halo, bonus, free-rider or other 
multiplier effects can be envisaged). 
11) David Hume explains how induction – and not reasoning – allows us to link these two 
propositions: “I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, 
and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with 
similar effects”. Hume then explains: “I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition 
may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you 
insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that 
reasoning.” (Hume, 1902 (1748): part II §29) 
12) Francisco Linares distinguishes weak from strong unintended consequences: 
“Unintended consequences which are foreseeable (whether desirable or undesirable) are not 
“unexpected” in the same sense that unforeseeable ones are (that is why they are “weak”), 
because the causal mechanism in the second case is not usually clear” (Linares, 2009: 8). 
13) The alternative livelihoods approach has emerged in order to overcome the limitation 
of previous development approaches that have been “designed as a specific response to 
reductions in opium production” but did not address “the underlying structural and 
institutional reasons that have led to the growth of opium poppy cultivation in the first place” 
(Mansfield, 2007: 70). 
14) The speed of implementation that characterizes forced eradication actually explains, 
in part, its non durability. 
15) The rumor actually went that such an outcome was actually intended or at least that 
the Taliban planned on benefiting from the sale of opium stocks at increased prices. 
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